Language, culture, legal traditions and international criminal justice. by Bohlander,  Michael
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
28 August 2014
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Bohlander, Michael (2014) 'Language, culture, legal traditions and international criminal justice.', Journal of
international criminal justice., 12 (3). pp. 491-513.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqu034
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Journal of International
Criminal Justice following peer review. The deﬁnitive publisher-authenticated version Bohlander, Michael (2014)
'Language, culture, legal traditions and international criminal justice.', Journal of international criminal justice, 12 (3):
491-513 is available online at: http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/content/12/3/491.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
1 
 
Language, intellectual culture, legal traditions and 
international criminal justice 
 
 
Michael Bohlander
*
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Our view of the world is to a large degree a function of our own language and culture. English has become the 
lingua franca in international legal academic and practical dialogue, and there is a related concern that the 
English – or its direct descendant, Anglo-American – intellectual and legal culture has drawn a thick veneer 
over the canvas of international criminal law as well. The differences in linguistic and cultural influence need 
attention as they are a primary determinant of that dialogue, not merely in form but possibly also in substance. 
The conversation, even in the lingua franca, does not seem to happen with the same intensity from all sides to 
the exchange, because in addition to the question of ability to engage there seems to be a difference in 
willingness or interest based not merely on lack of language command, but possibly also on cultural aversion. 
The main systemic divide in the conversations in international criminal law still is the dichotomy between 
common and civil law, and coinciding with that between a practical/pragmatic approach on the one hand, and a 
doctrinal/principled attitude on the other. This paper will attempt to elaborate on some of the conceptual and 
cultural differences, beyond the superficial labels often used in the discussion, such as “adversarial vs. 
inquisitorial”, “statute vs. judge-made law” etc., as they may impact on the creation of international criminal 
law.  
 
Keywords: Language; intellectual culture; legal tradition; international criminal justice; civil law; common law; 
doctrine; pragmatism. 
 
 
Introduction  
 
As Wittgenstein rightly emphasised when he said “the limits of my language are the limits of 
my world” 1, our view of the world is to a large degree a function of our own language2 and 
culture. English has become
3
 the lingua franca in international legal academic and practical 
dialogue, and there is a related concern that the English – or its direct descendant, Anglo-
American – intellectual and legal culture has drawn a thick veneer over the canvas of 
international criminal law as well. The differences in linguistic and cultural influence need 
                                                          
*
 Chair in Comparative and International Criminal Law, Durham Law School (UK). – I would like to thank 
Stefan Kirsch, Dawn Rothe, Peter Wilkitzki, Wolfgang Schomburg and the anonymous reviewer for comments 
on an earlier version. The usual disclaimers apply. 
1
 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,  Proposition 5.6 (1933). 
2
 Guy Deutscher, Through the Language Glass: Why The World Looks Different In Other Languages, 2011. 
3
 How long it will remain so is open to question, see Nicholas Ostler, The Last Lingua Franca: The Rise and Fall 
of World Languages, 2011. 
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attention as they are a primary determinant of that dialogue, not merely in form but possibly 
also in substance. The need for a better understanding spans diverse communities: Academia 
as a research community, international organisations, parliaments and governments, the 
courts and the legal profession(s) as well as the support professions such as court interpreters 
as a practical community, and lastly the undergraduate and postgraduate (law) student 
community which feeds all of the above, and whose exposure to the language and culture of 
other systems is thus absolutely critical. The conversation, even in the lingua franca, does not 
seem to happen with the same intensity from all sides to the exchange, because in addition to 
the question of ability to engage there seems to be a difference in willingness or interest 
based not merely on lack of language command, but possibly also on cultural aversion. This 
has a direct impact on the level of international criminal law, as I explained elsewhere
4
. The 
main systemic divide in the conversations in international criminal law still is the dichotomy 
between common and civil law, and coinciding with that between a practical/pragmatic 
approach on the one hand, and a doctrinal/principled attitude on the other. This paper will 
attempt to elaborate on some of the conceptual and cultural differences, beyond the 
superficial nuts-and-bolts labels often used in the discussion, such as “adversarial vs. 
inquisitorial”, “statute vs. judge-made law” etc., as they may impact on the creation of 
international criminal law
5
. Due to reasons of space, the article can only serve to highlight 
several areas worthy of further investigation
6
.  
 
It is, however, necessary to insert a fundamental disclaimer at this early stage: There is no 
such thing as “the” common or civil law system. Over the course of history the countries 
belonging to each of those families of legal systems have all given their idiosyncratic national 
cultural imprint to any template they may have inherited through political affiliation or 
colonial influence. Moreover, none of the two systems has survived in its pristinely pure 
                                                          
4
 Radbruch Redux: The need for revisiting the conversation between common and civil law at root level at the 
example of international criminal justice. (2011) Leiden Journal of International Law,  393. 
5
 There have been earlier publications in the linguistic/cultural context and/or on the adversarial-inquisitorial 
divide, see, for example, in this journal only Almqvist, The Impact of Cultural Diversity on International 
Criminal Proceedings, JICJ (2006) 745, who touches upon both the internal workings of the tribunals and on the 
wider cultural interface points with their end-users; or Acquaviva,  At the Origins of Crimes against Humanity – 
Clues to a Proper Understanding of the Nullum Crimen Principle in the Nuremberg Judgment, JICJ (2011) 881 
and Saxon, International Criminal Procedure: The Interface of Civil Law and Common Law (2013) Cambridge 
Law Journal (publication review). - However, this paper argues for a root-and-branch revised empirical 
approach describing the state of affairs in more detail than was done heretofore. 
6
 In this context it may be apposite to mention that the three principals of the International Criminal Court 
(President, Prosecutor and Registrar) have agreed to support officially a planned major empirical linguistic-
cultural study by the author of the Court - Letter from President Song of 13 December 2013 – Ref. 
2013/PRES/00310-2 – on file with the author. Nor is it the aim of this paper to provide a discussion of material 
concepts of law addressed in the argument below. 
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form.  However, in order to bring out the main diverging characteristics it is not necessary to 
engage in an all-out survey of all legal systems belonging to one family
7
 or the other: Almost 
all the points worth making in an outline context like the present one can be extracted from 
looking at the relatively pure mother system of the common law, namely the law of England 
and Wales, and comparing it, where appropriate, to one of the major and doctrinally 
sophisticated continental jurisdictions, Germany.  
 
Definitions
8
 
 
For ease of reference, it is helpful to set out again two pithy definitions of both common and 
civil law while stressing at the same time that their summary character bears in itself the 
potential for distortion by oversimplification. They need to be read against the background of 
what follows.  
 
Common law – concept and main jurisdictions 
 
Common law in the meaning referred to in this context is the family of systems based on the 
historical colonial spheres of influence of the British Empire, and is typically characterised in 
substantive law by a reliance on case-by-case judicial law-making and the absence of 
comprehensive codifications
9
 as opposed to statutes regulating individual areas, and a certain 
aversion to ex-ante doctrinal investigations of the underlying principles; it is thus in essence 
an inductive system. In procedural law, common law is most often affiliated with a heavy lay 
involvement in judicial decision-making
10
 and the adversarial procedural model, with the 
ensuing reduced role of the judge in the trial process. The main common law jurisdictions can 
be found in the Commonwealth, the United States and other former colonies of the British 
Empire, yet in recent years especially in procedural terms the adversarial system and the use 
of lay judges have exerted a certain appeal in, for example, the Central Asian Republics who 
                                                          
7
 See for the often neglected system of Islamic law Bohlander/Hedayati-Kakhki, Criminal Justice under Shari’ah 
in the 21st Century - An Inter-Cultural View. (2009) Arab Law Quarterly. 417. 
8
 See Patrick Glenn, Legal traditions of the world, 4
th
 ed., 2010.  
9
 But see Bohlander/Birkett, Codification of Criminal Law. International Library of Essays in Criminal Law, 
2013. 
10
 This is, however, overall not an accurate picture. See on the lay involvement in Europe the table in Bohlander, 
Laienrichter in der Strafjustiz - Ein Vergleich am Beispiel der Rechtsordnungen von England, Spanien und 
Frankreich, in Marutschke (ed.) Laienrichter in Japan, Deutschland und Europa - Japanisch-Deutsches 
Symposium, Doshisha University Law School, Kyoto, 15 May 2005, 62 at 64 – 65, and the more up-to-date 
country reports regarding the EU Member States at https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_ordinary_courts-18-
en.do.  
4 
 
are considering their adoption in one form or another
11
, not least through the efforts of 
organisations such as the American Bar Association’s  (ABA) CEELI (Central and Eastern 
European Law Initiative) programme, now called the ABA Rule of Law Initiative.
12
 Italy in 
1988 also moved towards an adversarial procedural model.
13
 
 
 
Civil law – concept and main jurisdictions 
 
 
Civil law jurisdictions are often called continental law systems, because their origins stem 
from the major legal traditions of the European continent, mainly from French and German 
law, which in turn have borrowed over history from Roman law to differing degrees. Civil 
law systems are often connected in substantive law to comprehensive codifications, a more 
restricted judicial role in law-making and a penchant for ex-ante doctrinal study with a 
stronger academic influence
14
. Procedurally, they are frequently linked to a prevalence of 
professional judges over the lay element and the so-called inquisitorial – better: judge-led – 
procedural model, which emphasises the central and pro-active role of the judge. Civil law 
systems can be found in the continental European jurisdictions and their previous colonies. 
Since Germany never had a similarly large colonial or trade empire compared to Britain, 
France, the Netherlands, Spain or Portugal, it is worth noting that German substantive 
criminal law doctrine nonetheless enjoys high respect in Spain and many of the Latin 
American countries. 
 
Relevance of this particular dichotomy 
 
Prior to 1993 one might have said with some justification that the study of these diverse 
models was a matter of academic interest, with few real-world applications. However, with 
the advent of the modern international criminal tribunals such as the ICTY, ICTR and lastly 
                                                          
11
 Schroeder/Kudratov, Das strafprozessuale Vorverfahren in Zentralasien zwischen inquisitorischem und 
adversatorischem Modell, 2012. 
12
 http://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/rule_of_law.html. 
13
 Maiwald, Einführung in das italienische Strafrecht und Strafprozeßrecht, 2009, 169 ff.. 
14
 See e.g. Vogenauer, 'An Empire of Light? II: Learning and Lawmaking in Germany Today' (2006) 26 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, 627; and 'An Empire of Light? Learning and Lawmaking in the History of German 
Law' (2005) 64 Cambridge Law Journal, 481.  
 
5 
 
the ICC, comparative criminal law research – and the common law/civil law divide in 
particular – was pushed into the limelight. Similarly, the increasing criminal law competence 
of the European Union meant that a deeper mutual understanding of the major traditions of its 
Member States became necessary. 
 
 
Common and civil law as the major comparator systems in international criminal law 
 
 
Prior research by the author and others
15
 has shown that while finding general sources of 
international law, absent a specific negotiated statute such as the Rome Statute of the ICC, 
involves a review of all major legal systems of the world according to Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, there is nonetheless a concentration of sources 
emanating from common and civil law systems, and more often than not the majority of them 
is extracted from citations in English and from a common law background. Similar comments 
may be made in the context of Article 21 of the ICC Statute.  Not even the much more 
densely regulated legal environment of the ICC is a closed and legally autarkic system, a fact 
which any argument questioning the need for the judges and other actors to engage in 
comparative work in the wider sense fails to appreciate. Examples of sources drawn from 
major regions and countries which do not use Western European languages or Latin script, 
for example Arabic, Chinese, Japanese and Russian, are few and far between. In practice, 
therefore, the dichotomy of “common vs. civil law” is the dominant paradigm for the 
systemic conversation in international courts and tribunals, if only for reasons of language
16
. 
 
Doctrinal conflicts in international criminal law  
 
 
                                                          
15
 Bohlander/Findlay,  The use of domestic sources as a basis for international criminal law principles, (2002) 
The Global Community, Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence, 3;  Bohlander, The influence of 
academic research on the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia – A 
first overview (2003) The Global Community: Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence, 195; 
Bohlander, The General Part: Judicial Developments, in Bassiouni (ed.) International Criminal Law, vol. III: 
517. 
16
 There is, however, a suspicion that especially Arabic sources are neglected insofar as they refer to the 
Shari’ah, a system seen by many as anachronistic and in substance irreconcilable with modern analytical legal 
discourse. 
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The above-mentioned dichotomy which may to a large extent be based on linguistic selection, 
results in the clash of doctrines and sometimes fundamental attitudes inherited by the 
representatives of the jurisdictions making up the spectrum of opinions at any international 
criminal court. Despite the fact that on the surface substantive criminal law concepts in 
common law and civil law seem to be similar, a deeper analysis will show that this is far from 
being the case.
17
 One of the major fields of debate in recent years, ever since the landmark 
decision in the appeals judgment of the ICTY in Prosecutor v Tadic of 15 July 1999
18
, has 
been the emergence of two different schools of thought regarding the manner in which the 
participation of multiple offenders in a crime should be treated. The ICTY started a line of 
reasoning in Tadic that applied joint criminal enterprise (JCE) doctrine to hierarchical 
structures and more common scenarios of a joint commission, in a loose form of 
extrapolation from common law sources. Later cases looked at the concept of the “control 
over the act” (Tatherrschaft) theory, created mainly by the German scholar Claus Roxin19, 
who became famous for his doctrinal figure of the “perpetrator behind the perpetrator”20 
which made it possible to treat the mastermind of an operation who was not present at the 
scene of the crime as a principal and not as a mere secondary participant. In German law, this 
classification has direct implications for both conviction and sentence, whereas English law, 
for example, under s. 8 Aiders and Abettors Act 1861, treats all participants alike as far as the 
conviction is concerned but allows for differences in the sentence – as long as there is not a 
mandatory sentence attached, as there is for murder. The ICC, especially its Pre-Trial 
Chamber, had from the beginning expressed a stronger inclination towards the Roxin model, 
possibly influenced by the provenance of some of the Chamber’s legal support staff21. The 
Trial Chamber in its judgment in Lubanga
22
 had followed this approach, yet two judges, 
Fulford in a separate opinion to Lubanga
23
, and van den Wyngaert in her concurring opinion 
in Chui
24
, have criticised the methodological approach of relying almost exclusively on one 
academic school from one particular jurisdiction as a means of interpreting an international 
document such as the Rome Statute. Fulford in particular makes the point about the need or 
                                                          
17
 See my paper Nullum crimen sine poena – Zur Unberechenbarkeit völkerstrafrechtlicher Lehrenbildung 
 in Alwart (ed.) Freiheitsverluste im Recht (forthcoming 2014). 
18
 Available online at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf. 
19
 Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft, 8th ed., 2006 
20
 See also Bohlander, Principles of German Criminal Law, 2009, 158 on the clandestine adoption of that 
approach by the German judiciary. 
21
 See above fn. 17. 
22
 Available online at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf.  
23
 Available online at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838-A.pdf. 
24
 Available online at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1529537.pdf. 
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not of attaching any significance to doctrinal classifications of modes of participation as far 
as sentencing is concerned, which is in a similar vein as s. 8 Aiders and Abettors Act 1861. 
This paper will not engage in the discussion of which approach is the better view, yet it is 
obvious that it is highly undesirable in a fledgling system such as international criminal law 
and the enhanced need to create legal certainty to have such widely diverging judicial 
opinions. This is another example of the potentially nefarious consequences of the use of so-
called “constructive ambiguity” or delegation of judicial interpretation so often favoured by 
diplomatic negotiators who do not always think through what this ambiguity might lead to in 
practice
25
. 
 
 
Judicial command and use of language: “…the English version being authentic?” 
 
 
Directly connected to the previous point is the question of the linguistic abilities of the 
judges. After all, they decide which citations make it into a decision and qualify as proper 
sources of international law. Previous related research
26
 by the author on the ICTY paints a 
bleak picture in that respect as far as common law judges are concerned: They display a 
command of foreign languages to a clearly lesser degree than their civil law counterparts. 
Many of them only speak English as the official language of their home country, and their 
local home dialect which will often not be used for legal work in their country of origin. The 
decisions issued in international tribunals, especially the ICTY and ICTR, had a final notice 
which stated which language was to be authoritative for its interpretation – mostly it was 
English
27
. In the case of members of the Commonwealth, this linguistic phenomenon can be 
directly linked to the effects of colonisation.  In order to update the picture, a survey of the 
language abilities of all the judges at the ICC since the first elections in 2003 was conducted, 
                                                          
25
 See the ECCC judgment in  Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav, Case 001, of 26 July 2010 – online verfügbar 
unter http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/documents/court/judgement-case-001 (and on JCE in general 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/topic/373), which opined that the so-called JCE III was not part of customary 
international law. 
26
 See fn. 15 above for references. 
27
 One judge from Canada criticised this practice early on, yet to no avail, see Prosecutor v Tadic, Case. No. IT-
94-1-AR.72, A.Ch., Separate Declaration of Judge J. Deschênes on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, of 2 October 1995. 
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based on the CVs and statements put forward during the election process
28
, resulting in Table 
1 (current as of May 2013). 
 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
  
                                                          
28
 See the materials available/referenced online at 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/asp/1stsession/report/english/add1/annex_listofdocs_e.pdf and www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/elections/Pages/elections.aspx. 
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Table 1 
Languages spoken by the former and current judges of the ICC (May 2013) 
 
Name Home country Languages spoken 
1. Aluoch Kenya E, Dho, F, Kis 
2. Blattmann Bolivia E, F, Ger, S 
3. Carmona Trinidad and Tobago E, S 
4. Cotte France E, F 
5. Defensor-Santiago Philippines E, Fil 
6. Diarra Mali E, F 
7. Eboe-Osuji Nigeria E, F, Ibo 
8. Fernandez de Gurmendi Argentina E, F, S 
9. Fremr Czech Republic E, Cze, F, R 
10. Fulford United Kingdom E 
11. Harding Clark Ireland E, F 
12. Herrera Carbuccia Dominican Republic E, F, S 
13. Hudson-Philipp Trinidad and Tobago E 
14. Jorda France E, F, S 
15. Kaul Germany E, F, Ger, Nor 
16. Kirsch Canada E, F, S 
17. Koroula Finland D, E, F, Fin, Ger, R, S, Swe 
18. Kuneheiya Ghana E, F 
19. Monageng Botswana E, Set, Ika 
20. Morrison United Kingdom E, F 
21. Nsereko Uganda E, Ger, Lug, Kis, Kin 
22. Odio Benito Costa Rica E, F, S 
23. Ozaki Japan E, F, J 
24. Pikis Cyprus E, Gre 
25. Pillay South Africa E 
26. Politi Italy E, F, I 
27. Saiga Japan E, J 
28. Shahabuddeen Guyana E 
29. Slade Samoa E 
30. Song South Korea E, F, Kor 
31. Steiner Brazil E, F, P, S 
32. Tarfusser Italy E, F, Ger, I 
33. Trendafilova Bulgaria Bul, E, Ger, R 
34. Usacka Latvia E, Lat, R 
35. Van den Wyngaert Belgium E, F, D, Ger, I, S 
 
Note: 
 
Bul = Bulgarian; Cze = Czech; E = English; D = Dutch; Dho = Dholuo; F = French; Fil = Filipino; Fin = 
Finnish; Ger = German; Gre = Greek; I = Italian; Ibo = Ibo; Ika = Ikalanga; J = Japanese; Kin = Kinyarwanda; 
Kis = Kiswahili; Kor = Korean; Lat = Latvian; Lug = Luganda; Nor = Norwegian; P = Portuguese; R= Russian; 
S = Spanish; Set = Setswana; Swe = Swedish. 
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This table shows a massive preponderance of two languages among the ICC judges: English 
and French, as summarised in Table 2. 
 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
 
Table 2 
Preponderance of languages spoken by judges at the ICC 
 
Language Number of judges who speak it 
English 35 
French 22 
Spanish 8 
German 7 
Russian 4 
Italian 3 
Dutch 2 
Japanese 2 
Kiswahili 2 
 
Bulgarian 1 
Czech 1 
Dholuo 1 
Finnish 1 
Greek 1 
Ibo 1 
Ikalanga 1 
Kinyarwanda 1 
Korean 1 
Latvian 1 
Norwegian 1 
Portuguese 1 
Setswana 1 
Swedish 1 
 
  
11 
 
The gap between those two and the next most commonly spoken language, Spanish, is very 
wide. In percentages (n = 93 as the sum of all languages times the number of judges who 
speak them) this means that English makes up for 37.6% of all the languages represented 
among the judiciary and is at the same time the only language which achieves 100% coverage 
across the entire judiciary. French accounts for 23.7%, Spanish for 8.6%, German for 7.5%, 
Russian for 4.3%, Italian for 3.2%, Dutch, Japanese and Kiswahili for 2.2% each and the 
remaining 14 languages (1.1% each) for 15.4%. English is thus more than twice as frequent 
as the last 14 languages represented only once each, it accounts for more than the sum of all 
other multiple languages except French. English and French together are roughly double the 
percentage of the other multiple languages and still about 15% above the sum of all other 
languages. In any event, the languages spoken by the judges do not correlate directly to those 
spoken by their assistants or clerks. Nothing beyond the anecdotal was known about the latter 
so far, and we need to remind ourselves that it is the judges who (should) decide which 
sources merit inclusion as proper sources, not their assistants. The tables alone, however, 
show us that they would not be in a position to evaluate sources in major languages such as, 
for example, Chinese and Arabic, even if their assistants could. However, during the writing 
of this paper the author conducted a survey among the 35 legal officers working in Chambers 
at the ICC
29
 and succeeded in getting an impression of the use of languages by them. The 
results are set out in Table 3. 
 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 
  
                                                          
29
 The author would like to thank the Division Presidents of the ICC for agreeing to the survey being carried out, 
the legal assistants who responded, and particularly Dr Philipp Ambach, Special Advisor to the ICC President, 
for facilitating the logistical side. 
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Table 3 
Languages used by legal officers in Chambers at the ICC 
 
 
 
Respondent Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 a) Q 3 b) 
1 D, E, F, G, S  E, F, G, S E E 
2 E, F E F F 
3 E, F, G, S E, F E, G E, F 
4 E, F, S E, F, S E, S E 
5 E, F, I E E E 
6 E, F E E E 
7 E, F E, F E, F E, F 
8 E, F E, F E E 
9 E E E E 
10 E, F, G E, F, G E, G E 
 
 
Notes: 
 
1.  n = 35, the return rate is thus 28.6% and not statistically significant. The table thus provides merely an 
impressionist snapshot. 
 
2. The questions were: 
 
1) Which languages do you speak to a level that allows you to engage in legal research for the ICC? 
2) Which languages do you regularly use for your research in the ICC? 
3) Which languages do you use when corresponding with the ICC judges you work for about your research? 
 
a) Between you and individual judges of a Chamber unofficially during the course of a research project? 
b) Between you and the judges acting officially as a Chamber? 
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It becomes apparent from the table that there appears to exist a definite filtering effect from 
the array of languages spoken by legal officers, through the languages used by them for 
research, for communication with the individual judges they worked for and finally the 
Chamber as a whole. Most curious is the apparent self-censure by some legal staff with 
regard to which languages they use for research. At the final stage, the language that is left is 
mostly English and some French. With mixed background panels, it would almost appear that 
English trumps all other languages as long as there is one judge on the panel who does not 
speak any language but English.  
 
A related question is the availability of materials in the ICC Library: If – apart from any 
online resources – the library itself stocked materials from certain jurisdictions or languages 
and not others, this would restrict the available materials. The question was put to the ICC 
Librarian and this was the reply
30
: 
 
“On a general level we collect mainly in the following languages:  English, French, Spanish, German, 
Portuguese, Italian, Arabic. 
However we do also have a few books in the following languages:  Japanese, Chinese, Russian, Polish, 
Czech, Romanian, Hebrew, Finnish, Norwegian, Swedish, Dutch, Danish. We would have some 
dictionaries in African languages, Swahili, for example.  Also we have a Latin dictionary. 
We would not have many items in any other languages not mentioned above, that I may have omitted. 
In short, we would include in our collection relevant books in any language, bearing in mind the State 
Parties and their languages.   However, we do have difficulty purchasing material in some languages, 
and they are received mostly by donation eg collections donated by Judges or The Prosecutor when 
they leave the Court. 
In our online catalogue, under Advanced search you can choose a language to see if we hold anything 
in that language.” 
  
  
The majority of the active library acquisition thus focusses on seven languages of which 
Arabic and Portuguese do not feature in the selection of languages used by the legal officers 
in their research in the sample above. Arabic is not spoken by a single judge. To which extent 
the library acquisition is related to requests from the Office of the Prosecutor or other organs 
of the ICC or even the ASP is unclear at this point – it would be another useful exercise to 
study the filings of the OTP or other parties to see whether they use such sources. It is further 
noticeable that it cannot be guided by the six official languages of the ICC, either, since 
Chinese and Russian are not included in the main acquisition – not surprising from a practical 
point of view, maybe, since neither China nor Russia are States Parties to the Rome Statute, 
yet the Statute lists these languages regardless of the fact of ASP membership. In any event, 
                                                          
30
 Email from Philipp Ambach, ICC, to the author of 30 May 2013 – on file with author. – Outside access to the 
advanced search feature was not available to the author. 
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there appears to be a partly rather haphazard approach to acquiring literature, with donations 
by judges and staff leaving the ICC being relied upon. It stands to reason that the works so 
donated will to a large extent not be the latest editions. This may all, however, be less of a 
problem in practice given the vastly improved online resource access available these days. 
Nonetheless, it is a matter worth investigating in more detail. 
 
It would naturally be interesting to correlate this picture with the actual mode of citation in all 
of the judicial decisions of the ICC so far, but that is beyond the scope of this paper and must 
be reserved for another time. However, the author checked the sources used in the Lubanga 
Trial Judgment
31
 (Judges Fulford, Odio-Benito and Blattmann) including the 
separate/dissenting opinions by Judges Fulford and Odio-Benito, to perform this exercise at 
least on one major document (624 pages). The following picture emerges: 
 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
 
Table 4 
Sources by type and language – Lubanga trial judgment 
 
Language Judicial Academic Statute Other Total 
E - 55 1 9 65 
F - 1 - - 1 
G - 13 - - 13 
S - 2 - - 2 
 
These sources did not include ICC decisions or those by other international courts or 
tribunals, nor UN documents or international treaties – which made up a large share of the 
sources overall and were all in English because the original source was already operating a 
choice of working languages (mainly English and French) in an international setting, rather 
than a language of natural domestic origin. Not one citation was made to a judicial source 
which was not from an international court. The others include multiple citations of the Oxford 
Dictionary of the English Language.  The vast majority of the academic references are 
multiple citations of the commentaries or textbooks by Triffterer, Dörrmann, Pictet, Schabas, 
Lee and Werle on the ICC or international criminal/humanitarian law. The majority of the 
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German citations are to Roxin’s Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft – and many of these are 
actually found in Judge Fulford’s opinion who did not agree with the Roxin-based view to 
begin with – which got a few more references in substance but not by mention by the Trial 
Chamber’s reference to a Pre-Trial Chamber decision on the issue. In percentages, with n = 
81, this means that 80.3 % of the sources used in the judgment were in English, 1.2% in 
French, 16 % in German and 2.4 % in Spanish.  Judge Fulford speaks only English, but both 
other judges also speak French and Spanish, Judge Blattmann also speaks German. In sum, 
this judgment, including the separate/dissenting opinions, used less than 20 different sources 
in total and over 4/5 of them were in English. 88 % of the sources overall were academic 
sources, i.e. those on the lowest tier of the hierarchy of Article 38(1) ICJ Statute and Article 
21 ICC Statute. Furthermore, it is highly questionable whether the commentaries and the 
textbook cited are sources from common law systems qua English language: They refer to 
international law topics such as the ICC Statute or International Humanitarian Law and 
collect the material available on them, with a heavy emphasis on analysing the previous case 
law of the international tribunals and courts and to a greater or lesser extent, of the relevant 
academic literature. They are also written by contributors from a number of national 
backgrounds, from both common and civil law jurisdictions, who are well-versed and 
respected in the field either through prior practical affiliation with the institutions or through 
academia. In effect, the international criminal justice system as presented in Lubanga seems 
to have become or at least to be on its way to being self-referencing and self-reinforcing. The 
degree of analytical critique of and extrapolation from that case law or the lack thereof in 
those works, however, could be a material indicator of a preponderance of either a civil law 
or a common law approach, i.e. the more critical analysis and extrapolation, the more civil 
law leaning the attitude. 
 
 
Modes of law-making, argument and terminology 
 
 
Common and civil law jurisdictions do not only differ in substance, both as far as substantive 
and procedural law are concerned, but also in the approach they take when dealing with 
making law, arguing about the application of law, and the terminology they use in these 
contexts. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is a distinct difference of systemic self-
perception, both as far as the roots of and the paradigms behind the development of legal 
16 
 
principles are concerned. There may thus be a deeper cultural rift between common and civil 
lawyers which goes beyond the typically highlighted codification debate. 
 
 
Intellectual styles of argument 
 
 
One of those anecdotal pieces of evidence for a deeper cultural rift is the distinction between 
what one might call definitions based on the phenotype of a legal problem and the genotype, 
with the common law following the former, the civil law the latter. This is intricately linked 
to the role of procedure in arriving at a definition or in coining a legal concept, and the role 
intellectual thinking plays in a society overall. Procedural thinking is by its very nature 
pragmatic thinking: Criminal procedure is about real-life problems that await a real-life 
solution through a real-life process, not an academic dissection of concepts. Such 
pragmatism, however, also pervades the discussion about substantive law in the common law 
environment. This fashion of finding the law has a lot to do with the emphasis on lay 
participation in criminal proceedings, especially in the form of the juror as the sole fact-finder 
who pronounces on guilt and innocence after having been instructed and guided by the 
professional judge on the law. This makes it simply nonsensical and undesirable to develop 
intellectually sophisticated doctrinal structures which by their very purpose are unfit for the 
untrained layman and only make sense in an environment of legally trained professionals 
with their own code of conversation
32
. George Fletcher has made the connection between this 
procedural manner of reasoning and the terminology in Anglo-American law
33.  
 
Common law, cum grano salis, thus stresses the need for making sure the procedural rules 
are complied with, historically flowing from the task of the professional judge of facilitating 
a reasonable decision by lay persons on questions of fact; civil law, however, emphasises the 
intellectual logic and coherence of the nature of the substantive law, which is the very 
domain of the professional judges, who typically decide on questions of fact and law. The 
common law system – and here again we must naturally warn against generalisations – based 
on its original culture has thus only a limited interest in doctrinalisation, as opposed to 
abstract legal theory and philosophy of law. In other words, it has a tendency of neglecting 
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 See Mirjan Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority (1986), 28 
33
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the middle level between the lower rung of “mere” practice and the higher rung of totally 
abstract thinking about law. This middle level is what goes – among other things – in German 
terminology by the name of Rechtswissenschaft, a word often translated as “legal science” 
and almost invariably given a somewhat pejorative connotation
34
.  
 
The author submits that there is no direct equivalent to this German concept, for example, in 
English law and the systems it spawned and which still closely adhere to it. In fact, as 
recently as 2012, a UK Supreme Court Justice, Lord Sumption, expressed the view that it was 
better for aspiring lawyers to read for a non-law degree rather than study law. He said 
verbatim: 
 
"Appreciating how to fit legal principles to particular facts is a real skill. Understanding the social or 
business background to legal problems is essential. I'm not sure current law degrees train you for that, 
nor really are they designed to. "This is not a criticism of the course. It's simply a recognition of the 
fact that a command of reasoning skills, an ability to understand and use evidence, and broad literary 
culture are all tremendously valuable to any advocate.  "If you don't have them you are going to find it 
difficult to practise. If you don't know any law that is not a problem; you can find out."
35
.  
 
 
There are differences in degree, especially if one looks at United States legal academia, but in 
principle this is where a major difference seems to exist between common and civil law – 
which is not to say that the civil law does not know of differences in this respect, too:  The 
“obsession” with doctrinal argument, if one wished to call it that, is almost equally high in the 
Spanish and Latin American countries, and to some extent in the Netherlands, Austria, 
Switzerland and Poland, for example, but not quite as ardently followed in France
36
.  
 
All of this, in turn, has to do with general and culturally conditioned modes of thinking, 
especially among the intellectual elites. The sociologist Johan Galtung in a seminal 1981 
essay
37
 on intellectual styles in the British/American, German, French and Japanese traditions 
(which he calls Saxonic, Teutonic, Gallic and Nipponic in order to avoid linking them to any 
one country in a given place and time in history and politics) created an overview of four 
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 See Bartie, The lingering core of legal scholarship, (2010) Legal Studies, 345. 
35
 See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/9384619/The-best-lawyers-are-not-law-
graduates-claims-judge.html#. 
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 See Jung, Recht und kulturelle Identität, (2009) ZStW 467; and id., Rechtsvergleich oder Kulturvergleich, in 
Freund/Murmann et al (eds.) Grundlagen und Dogmatik des gesamten Strafrechtssystems, 2013, 1467 and 
earlier Saleilles, Conception et objet de la science du droit comparé, (1900) Bulletin de la Société de Législation 
Comparée, 383.. 
37
 Galtung, Structure, culture and intellectual style: An essay comparing saxonic, teutonic, gallic and nipponic 
approaches, (1981) Social Science Informations, 817. 
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major intellectual styles (based on his own experience and not meant to be exhaustive) 
reproduced in Table 4 which would lend some support to the thesis expressed above: 
 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
 
Table 5 
A guide to intellectual styles 
 
 Saxonic Teutonic Gallic Nipponic 
Paradigm analysis Weak Strong Strong Weak  
Descriptions:  
proposition-production 
Very strong Weak Weak Strong 
Explanations:  
theory-formation 
Weak Very strong Very strong Weak 
Commentary on other intellectuals: 
 Paradigms 
 Propositions 
 Theories  
Strong Strong Strong Very strong 
 
Source: Galtung, ibid., 823. 
 
Galtung argues in particular that the Saxonic style of argument is driven by discursive 
process and exchange of views with no attempt to establish what he calls “pyramids” of 
theoretical constructs which aim at establishing an ordered vision of “truth”, not infrequently 
to the exclusion of other views, something he says is the hallmark of the Teutonic intellectual 
style
38
. However, while the Teutonic style may possess a tendency to exclude thought-
constructs of a different provenance, in his view (after all from 1981!) the Saxonic fact-
driven style – which he characterises as “rich in documentation and very meagre in theory, 
rich in formal language and poor in elegance”39 – is bolstered by the increased use of 
information technology and the reliance of present-day (inter-)governmental authorities on 
research which create massive data collections combined with joint research group efforts. 
Galtung particularly singles out the United Nations as susceptible to this way of research and 
argument
40
, not least based on the formal equality of the member states which in principle 
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militates against mutually exclusive positions. The Saxonic style and diplomatic comity thus 
go together much better than the latter and the Teutonic approach which is less interested in 
keeping things in the balance than in demonstrating the “substantive truth” and demanding 
obedience to the principles so found, regardless of whether that may mean having to best one 
or even all of the other parties to a debate and prove them “wrong”41. The common law in its 
own domestic context manages to sustain even highly controversial issues in a suspended 
balance of tension by giving public policy considerations precedence over any efforts at 
producing systemic coherence
42
. Galtung ventures into contemplating the question of whether 
there is a move towards the development of a global intellectual style, with the many 
differing styles “giving to the entire intellectual system a somewhat schizophrenic 
character”43.  His prognosis?  “What comes out of this in the long term remains to be seen; 
but it may be a saxonic Trojan horse”44. At least in this author’s view, Galtung might find 
himself very much at home with that attitude in the modern international criminal law 
environment.  
 
Returning to what we said above about the distinction between the common law’s phenotypic 
approach and the genotypic stance of the civil law, in other words form vs. substance, let us 
look at an early post-war landmark decision of the German Federal Court of Justice on the as 
a counter-example to the procedure-driven terminology of the common law
45
. One of the 
central tenets of the German approach is the Schuldprinzip, i.e. the requirement of personal 
guilt and blameworthiness as the determining parameters for liability and punishment. 
Combined with the lack of acceptance of any reverse burdens of proof in procedural law, the 
first obvious consequence is that German law rejects any idea of strict liability. The 
Schuldprinzip was famously established by the judgment of the Great Senate of the 
Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), the Federal Court of Justice, of 18 March 1952. In this case, a 
defence counsel had taken on the case of a lady without first agreeing on a fee. He then 
approached his client on the morning of the trial and asked her to pay him 50 Deutsche Mark 
(DEM) or he would decline to represent her, and when she paid him on the next day, he used 
the same threat to make her sign a fee note of 400 DEM. He was convicted of an offence 
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under § 240, Nötigung, which is akin to blackmail, but applies to any act or omission, not just 
financial or property transactions, to which the victim is coerced by the defendant under the 
use of threats or physical force. Apparently, his line of defence was that he thought he was 
entitled to ask that sum of her and thus did not know that he was acting unlawfully or 
rechtswidrig. The trial court convicted him based on the traditional Roman-law-based 
approach coined previously by the Reichsgericht, that a mistake about the criminal law, as 
opposed to errors about civil law underlying an offence which it treated as a mistake of fact,
46
 
did not provide a defence. The term ‘rechtswidrig’ in § 240 was not seen as an element of the 
actus reus, but as an expression of the general requirement of unlawfulness. The law at the 
time did only provide for mistakes of fact. Under the Reichsgericht’s jurisprudence, the 
defendant had no defence. The question which the BGH asked itself was whether this 
approach was still correct and decided it was not. Its judgment contains the following classic 
passage,
47
 which in its almost philosophical and in places rather convoluted diction typical of 
the time, is also a wonderful example of the cultural differences in the style of judicial 
reasoning: 
“Punishment is premised on guilt. Guilt means blameworthiness. By finding a defendant guilty we 
blame him for not having acted lawfully, for having chosen to break the law, although he could have 
acted lawfully, could have chosen to abide by the law. The inner reason for the judgment of guilt lies in 
the fact that man’s nature is grounded in the freedom and responsibility of moral self-determination, 
and that he is therefore capable to decide for the law and against injustice, to model his actions on the 
norms of the legal commands and to avoid that which is forbidden by law, as soon as he has gained 
moral maturity and as long as the natural capacity of moral self-determination is not temporarily 
paralysed or permanently destroyed by the illnesses mentioned in § 51 StGB. The pre-condition for a 
free and responsible human choice for the law, based on moral self-determination, is the knowledge of 
the law and of the forbidden. He who knows that what he chooses to do in freedom is unlawful, acts 
blameworthy if he does so despite this insight. That knowledge may be lacking because the defendant is 
unable, based on the illnesses mentioned in § 51(1) StGB, to appreciate the unlawfulness of his actions. 
In such a case the lack of knowledge is the consequence of an unavoidable fate. He cannot be blamed 
for it and incurs no guilt. He lacks mental responsibility under the criminal law. The awareness of 
acting unlawfully may, in individual cases, also be absent in an otherwise mentally competent person, 
because he does not know or fully comprehend the law prohibiting his actions. In this case of a mistake 
of law, too, the defendant is not in a position to make a choice against what is forbidden. Yet, not every 
mistake of law excludes blameworthiness. Gaps in one’s knowledge can to a certain extent be 
remedied. Because of his capacity for free moral self-determination, man must at all times make the 
responsible choice to act according to the law, as a participant in the legal community, and to avoid the 
unlawful. He does not live up to this obligation if he only abstains from doing that which he clearly 
perceives as unlawful. On the contrary, he must make himself aware in all of his plans whether they 
comply with the principles of what is required by the law. Doubts must be eradicated through reflection 
or consultation. What is required is a diligent effort of conscience, the measure of which depends on the 
circumstances of the case in question and the personal and professional background of each individual. 
If, despite having duly so exerted his conscience, he could not recognise the unlawfulness of his 
actions, the error was insuperable, the crime unavoidable. In such a case he cannot be found 
blameworthy. If, however, the offender could have realised the unlawfulness of his actions, had he but 
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duly exerted his conscience, the mistake of law will not exclude blameworthiness. Yet, depending on 
the degree to which the offender lacked the due diligence to exert his conscience, the degree of blame 
may be mitigated. Awareness of unlawfulness does, however, never require the knowledge of the fact 
that the action is punishable, nor the knowledge of the law that contains the prohibition. Moreover it is 
not sufficient that the offender is aware of the moral turpitude of his actions. Rather, he must recognise 
or be able to recognise with due diligence, the unlawfulness of his actions, not necessarily in the 
technical, juridical fashion, but in a general evaluation according to his intellectual abilities.”  
 
There is a marked difference in approach to the personal(ised) judicial opinions in common 
law appellate courts which under the stare decisis rule by necessity often focus on a 
rehashing of the previous case law. The above excerpt could as such just as well have been 
taken from a German criminal law textbook. It uses abstract and theoretical language aimed 
at establishing sound general principles which later courts will be able to apply, and it is not 
attributed to any one judge
48
 - not least because German law does not allow for separate or 
dissenting opinions below the level of the Federal Constitutional Court. 
 
 
Common law, public policy, aversion to (ex-ante) doctrinal systematisation and lack of 
systemic coherence   
 
 
Gustav Radbruch wrote in 1947 about the English approach to law-making in ‘Der Geist des 
englischen Rechts’ that the English were averse to building doctrinal structures ex-ante49. 
Radbruch pointed out that even where such codifications happen, they soon become 
overgrown with a layer of case law that quickly pushes the letter of the law aside as the prime 
source of reference.
50
 It is, in this context, a telling experience from the author’s own 
teaching at the law school of a highly respected UK university with a very selective entry 
threshold for its undergraduate degree, that virtually all students will without fail immediately 
refer to case law even if there is a statute in point and they have a copy of it in the tutorial or 
exam; it is enormously difficult for most of them to grasp and get used to the process of 
subsuming facts to the elements of an offence, to apply that simple synallagmatic process 
consistently and to use the case law only to interpret the statutory elements – something with 
which German law students grow up from day one of their law studies and for the omission 
of which in an exam they will be docked serious points. Similar issues about logical 
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coherence arose in the development of the so-called
51
 partial defences to murder, loss of 
control and diminished responsibility
52
, with the very idea of having “defences” that only 
apply to murder and to no other offence being something alien to a German mind. The Sexual 
Offences Act 2003 re-introduced a different standard of belief which a defendant would have 
to comply with to raise mistake of fact only in the context of sexual offences, leaving a 
different standard for all others, i.e. the dichotomy of honest vs. reasonable belief
53
. The 
urban myth of the flexible common law and the inflexible codified law, the superiority of 
inductive vs. deductive law-making, the often farcical game of circumventing unwanted 
effects of the rule of stare decisis by distinguishing and re-interpretation are also part of the 
arsenal of the debate in this context
54
. 
 
Because the law had to be used by lay persons as fact-finders, judges tried to remain as close 
as possible to ‘common sense’ when instructing them on the law, an attitude that had 
ramifications into the appellate case law and can even lead to the rejection of the appeal of 
logic. A particularly worrying recent example of a Supreme Court pandering to public 
opinion is the 2011 case of R v. Gnango
55
, which concerned an instance of gang violence. It 
was decided by the UK Supreme Court in a thinly – if at all – veiled application of public 
policy arguments over doctrinal concerns: A and B, members of two rival gangs, had engaged 
in a shootout in a public place during which C, a passer-by, was hit and killed. The bullet 
came from B’s gun, but only A could be arrested. There were doctrinal issues around joint 
criminal enterprise and transferred malice, and the Court of Appeal reversed A’s conviction 
for murder. The Supreme Court, however, was clearly uneasy with the idea of letting A go 
free on doctrinal technicalities and reinstated the conviction for murder, entailing a 
mandatory life sentence. The underlying public policy attitude aimed at curbing gang 
violence is best brought out in the separate opinion of Lord Brown: 
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[T]o my mind the all-important consideration here is that both A and B were intentionally engaged in a 
potentially lethal unlawful gunfight … in the course of which an innocent passerby [sic!] was killed. 
The general public would in my opinion be astonished and appalled if in those circumstances the law 
attached liability for the death only to the gunman who actually fired the fatal shot (which, indeed, it 
would not always be possible to determine). Is he alone to be regarded as guilty of the victim's murder? 
Is the other gunman really to be regarded as blameless and exonerated from all criminal liability for 
that killing? Does the decision of the Court of Appeal here, allowing A's appeal against his conviction 
for murder, really represent the law of the land? To my mind the answer to these questions is a plain 
"no". …56 
 
Another example of political meddling with doctrinal clarity is the campaign by the Tory 
Government in 2012/13 to amend the law of self-defence against burglars for homeowners 
and, on the face of it, to allow disproportionate force, as long as it was not grossly 
disproportionate – but only in that context. This campaign was carried to its successful 
conclusion with s. 43 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013
57
.  A personal encounter of the 
author with the Law Commission’s approach to solving doctrinal anomalies concerned a 
proposal to remedy two areas of doctrinal incoherence which could cause injustice to some – 
admittedly not many – defendants, namely that of transferred malice58 and the Serious Crime 
Act 2007
59
, in the context of invitations issued to UK academics by the Commission to 
identify areas of reform for their 11
th
 Programme of Law Reform. The proposal received a 
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Use of force in self-defence at place of residence 
 
(1) Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (use of reasonable force for purposes 
of self-defence etc) is amended as follows. . 
(2) Before subsection (6) (force not regarded as reasonable if it was disproportionate) insert— . 
“(5A)In a householder case, the degree of force used by D is not to be regarded as having been 
reasonable in the circumstances as D believed them to be if it was grossly disproportionate in those 
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negative reply mainly based – understandably – on lack of resources, but also contained the 
following passage: 
 
“Although we understand the problems you identify in the current law, we cannot identify sufficient 
potential benefits which would flow from reform. The issues you identify, while of academic interest, 
rarely if ever arise in practice and there is no evidence that they cause significant practical problems.”60 
 
Apparently, the concept of prosecutorial discretion
61
, so often trotted out by policy-makers 
(and practitioners as well as judges) in England and Wales, is meant to take care of these rare 
cases
62
. Doctrinal concerns are considered harmless and “academic” unless there is material 
injustice or “unfairness” being done to the accused in the actual case, and if there is such a 
danger, the proceedings can be discontinued etc. However, this approach – from a Teutonic 
view in the sense described by Galtung – takes the second step before the first: One can only 
exercise discretion whether or not to prosecute if there actually is something which would be 
a basis for prosecution in the first place. Doctrine comes before procedure and any exercise of 
procedural discretion: Fairness in a legal as opposed to a moral environment is decided on the 
basis of existing doctrinal parameters, not as an autonomous concept detached from its frame 
of reference. Not surprisingly, the Law Commission has now abandoned the ambitious 
codification project from the 1980s – for a reform by a thousand deaths63.  
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“We are the Borg. Resistance is futile.” – Galtung’s “saxonic Trojan horse” and systemic 
assimilation  
 
But all that is on the surface of the world. Underneath the styles will live on: the 
teutons will continue to be irritated when the gauls become too lyrical... and the gauls 
will continue to be bored by teutonic pedantry. Both of them will be grasping for 
perspectives and forms of understanding that will put some order into the untidy 
saxonic landscape of stubborn facts, and the saxons will get restless when the teutons 
and the gauls speed off into outer space, leaving a thin trail of data behind. Some of 
them will learn from the others what they do not master themselves, but by and large 
what is the virtue of one will continue to be the vice of the other. ... And that is all to 
the good: it would be dreadful if the entire human intellectual enterprise were to be 
guided by the same intellectual style.
64
 
 
 
One wishes one could simply agree with the conclusion in Galtung’s quote above. It seems so 
culturally all-encompassing and multifaceted in its approach, despite the intriguing fact – if 
not outright give-away – that in his final analysis the nipponic style no longer appears as a 
factor in the comparison and all is reduced to juxtaposing the representatives of the major 
civil and common law systems. In a purely academic context that happy multicultural résumé 
may be apposite, yet the most devastating effects of the “common law/civil law” divide today 
occur in international criminal practice and may have a bearing on how acts by defendants 
are classified and treated under law, in an area where the exactitude of the principles still 
leaves very much to be desired, as the perennial struggle over the concept of participation in 
crime, to name but one example, has shown. One needs to remember that people can go to 
prison for very long periods based on such inexact systemic parameters. The invocations of 
the august spirit of progress within the process of shaping a new and sui generis system of 
law on the international level not infrequently come from people whose practical experience 
in criminal proceedings is limited. The litmus test would appear to lie in the answer to the 
question of whether any of the proponents of that new world order would wish to be 
adjudicated under a legal system in their own countries which was similarly lacking in 
contours. Given the notorious populist resistance of, for example, the UK against the 
ECtHR’s (and EU’s) intrusion into the domestic law65 and practice and the similarly stark 
aversion of the US to the egalitarian demands of international law, one wonders whether 
some nations’ cultures of law do not take a more robust stance on these matters, to the 
detriment of an approach which could truly lead to a new development on the international 
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level.  After all, why should lesser standards apply in the cases of the most serious crimes 
imaginable? It is not outlandish to think that even the ICC Statute might not pass 
constitutional muster in the jurisdictions of all the States Parties if it was to be used there as a 
basis for domestic criminal law and procedure. If the friction between the two major relevant 
legal systems is in part to blame for that, then reinforced efforts should be made to arrive at a 
well-defined system of substantive and procedural law that does justice to the needs of the 
international criminal justice system, both in terms of legal certainty, efficiency and 
protection of defence rights.  
 
Whether the inductive, unprincipled common law approach and especially the adversarial 
model it brought with it are suitable for that endeavour is – certainly for this German author 
who has taught and written about English criminal law for almost a decade now – open to 
question. However, the international criminal law community currently still seems to be 
overwhelmingly speaking the language of the common law, not least, as we said, because it 
can much more easily form a kind of legal Esperanto with the spirit of flexibility, if not to say 
malleability, so prized in the international diplomatic community than, for example, the rigid, 
rule-bound, truth-seeking and theorising German(ic) approach. It also links much more easily 
with a system of judicial selection
66
 that does not put the exclusive emphasis on solid 
criminal (judicial) trial experience and thus allows persons to populate the international bench 
who are used to the relaxed reflective ruminations of academia or to pragmatic political 
practices of diplomacy or government. They do not need to be in control of the proceedings 
and on top of the evidential material in a case because the system allows them to be presented 
with it by the parties, who are running the case, and to retreat into the role of a more or less 
watchful umpire. Nor do they need to be in full command of the law themselves, because 
they have their legal officers to rely on for research into the more intricate legal problems, 
with all the consequences that entails
67
. The author’s first-hand observations in the 
international criminal justice environment have convinced him that in such a conversation the 
common law native speakers – using “native speaker” both literally and figuratively – trained 
in the cut and thrust of their own adversarial legal culture will almost always have the 
advantage over the former. With English at present being the main lingua franca there is a 
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danger that international criminal justice will continue to see itself through the eyes of that 
language of law and all the cultural luggage that comes with it. Academia in the civil law and 
other non-common law jurisdictions has an important role to play in ensuring that these two 
are progressively disconnected, not merely on the level of legal philosophy and theory, but on 
the level of practically useful and critical doctrinal debate. In essence, what is needed is an 
international criminal law Rechtswissenschaft that speaks English
68
 but which is not bound by 
the conceptual and traditional limits of the historical English-speaking culture. 
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 While still useful for a domestic debate, publications in languages other than English do not stand a serious 
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